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Men have become the tools of their tools. 
- Henry David Thoreau  
 
Henry David Thoreau could not have - or cared to for that matter- imagined the 
advancements in technology made since his death in 1862.1 Today, digital technology permeates 
every aspect of our daily lives. As a society, we have become dependent on our electronic 
devices and it seems that life, as we know it would cease without them.2 According to the Pew 
Research Center, as of January 2014 90% of American adults own a cell phone.3 Of those 
individuals, 68% of them own a smartphone.4 Today, 73% of American adults own a 
desktop/laptop computer and 45% own a tablet computer.5 84% of American adults use the 
Internet.6 We truly do live digital lives.7 Considering these statistics, it is no wonder that the 
                                                        
1
   Richard J. Schneider, Thoreau’s Life, The Thoreau Society (last visited November 22, 2016) 
http://www.thoreausociety.org/life-legacy.  
2
   Associated Press, Growing Dependence On Technology Raises Risks of Malfunction, Crain’s New York 
Business (July 9, 2015) http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150709/TECHNOLOGY/150709895/growing-
dependence-on-technology-raises-risks-of-malfunction.  
3
   Pew Research Center, Mobile Technology Fact Sheet (December 27, 2013) 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/.  
4
   Monica Anderson, The Demographics of Device Ownership, Pew Research Center (October 29, 2015) 
(This figure constitutes a 33% increase from mid-2011) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/the-demographics-
of-device-ownership/.  
5
   Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, Pew Research Center (October 29, 2015) 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/.  
6
   Andrew Perrin and Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, Pew Research Center (June 
26, 2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015/.  
7
  
collection of digital evidence has become essential to law enforcement.8 This is particularly true 
in cases involving child pornography.9  
However, what about cases in which private individuals discover incriminating evidence on 
their own? This often occurs in cases involving child pornography and raises challenging Fourth 
Amendment questions. For instance, when a private party searches a computer, sees a suspicious 
file, and reports the finding to the police, what kind of government search of the computer may 
take place? Do police exceed the scope of the warrantless “private search doctrine,” which 
allows them to verify the illegality of evidence discovered by a private party, if they open files 
other than those originally opened by the third party? Answering these questions become more 
complicated after the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California.10  
This paper will first examine the background Fourth Amendment principles and the 
development of the private search doctrine. Then this paper will analyze the ways in which the 
private search doctrine is applied to the digital world. Third, this paper will analyze the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Riley and its impact on the application of the private search doctrine in cases 
involving digital data. Lastly, the author calls for the United States Supreme Court to take action 
and settle the current circuit split.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
   Janna Anderson and Lee Rainie, Digital Life in 2025, Pew Research Center (March 11, 2014) (noting that 
experts predict the Internet will become “‘like electricity’ – less visible, yet more deeply embedded in people’s lives 
for good and ill”) http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/digital-life-in-2025/ 
8
   See Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis, and Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal 
Justice System, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, at 1 (last visited November 11, 2016) (modern devices 
serve as huge repositories of personal information yet be carried in a pocket and accessed with a single hand or even 
voice command) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248770.pdf 
9
   Id. at 7.  
10
   Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (police officers may not search an individual’s cellphone 
incident to arrest and must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of an arrestee’s cell phone). 
  
Please note: Many of the cases analyzed herein involve sensitive and often disturbing facts. 
The author is cognizant of that. Accordingly, the author did his best to balance the need for the 





I.The Fourth Amendment and The Private Search Doctrine  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated…11 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals and their 
property from unreasonable searches and seizures.12 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”13 In order for a search to 
implicate the Fourth Amendment, it must violate an individual’s legitimate expectation of 
privacy.14 In his often-citied concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated a two-pronged test to assess 
whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy.15 First, an individual must have 
                                                        
11
   U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
12
   Id.  
13
   Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
14
   See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1971) (holding that a search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because it “infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and hence was not a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).  
15
   Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that a “twofold requirement” is utilized 
to determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740 (1979) (stating that the Harlan test “embraces two discrete questions”); Thomas K. Clancy, The Search and 
Seizure of Computers and Electronic Evidence: The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: 
A Perspective and a Primer, 75 Miss. L.J. 193, 221 (Fall 205) (“A person seeking to challenge the propriety of a 
governmental search must establish that she has a protected interest, which the Supreme Court measures by 
ascertaining whether she ahs a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by the government.”).    
  
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy – the subjective prong – and second, that expectation 
must be recognized by society as reasonable – the objective prong.16 Today, the Supreme court 
states that a Fourth Amendment search does not occur unless “the individual manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,” and “society [is] willing 
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”17 
Under the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, warrantless searches are considered per 
se unreasonable.18 However, the Supreme Court has adopted some limited exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.19 Generally, a warrantless search will only be upheld if the government’s 
interest in gathering or preserving evidence outweighs an individual’s privacy interest.20 The 
Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rules generally establish that evidence obtained, as the result 
                                                        
16
   Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged 
from prior decisions is that a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be on that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”); 
see also Priscilla Grantham Adams, Fourth Amendment Applicability: Private Searches, National Center for Justice 
and Rule of Law, http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/PrivateSearchDoctrine.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2016); 
Marc Palumbo, Note: How Safe Is Your Data?: Conceptualizing Hard Drives Under the Fourth Amendment, 36 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 977, 982 (2009). 
17
   Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1976)).  
18
   See U.S. Const. amend. IV. (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularity describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to see seized.”); Katz, 
389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specially established and well-
delineated exceptions.”). 
19
   See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6 (applying the plain view exception to law enforcement 
search of dorm room); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (adopting the search incident to arrest 
exception and stating that it is reasonable for law enforcement to search a person being lawfully arrested for 
weapons or evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925) (creating the motor vehicle exception, 
which allows police to search a motor vehicle based on probable cause that contraband or relevant evidence will be 
uncovered). 
20
   See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 (2014) (“the Court generally determines whether to exempt 
a given type of search from the warrant requirement “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes 
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is need for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))). 
  
of an unlawful search, is not admissible against a criminal defendant.21 However, the pervious 
considerations are irrelevant unless a government agent conducts the challenged search.22  
 The Fourth Amendment is not implicated unless the government or one of its agents 
conducts the search in question.23 Accordingly, an unreasonable search or seizure conducted by a 
private individual does not violate the Fourth Amendment.24 Therefore, as long as the private 
individual conducting the search is not acting as an agent for the government, the discovered 
evidence is admissible against a criminal defendant.25 Consequently, the private search doctrine 
implicates two relevant considerations: (1) whether the searching party is a private individual or 
government agent, and (2) how far beyond the scope of the initial search can law enforcement go 
without obtaining a warrant. The following sections address each of these considerations in turn.  
A. The Government Agent Test  
Determining whether an individual is acting as a government agent or private actor is a case-
by-case inquiry, which considers the totality of the circumstances.26 Reviewing courts will 
consider (1) whether the government knew of, acquiesced, instigated, compensated or otherwise 
encouraged the search, and (2) whether the private actor’s purpose was to assist law 
                                                        
21
   See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)(holding that evidence obtained in searches and seizures that 
violate the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible). 
22
   See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects against 
unlawful searches and seizures and that protection applies only to governmental action). 
23
   Id.  
24
   See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to 
unreasonable searches by a private individual). 
25
   See Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971). 
26
   See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1989); See also Adams, Fourth 
Amendment Applicability: Private Searches, National Center for Justice and Rule of Law, 
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/PrivateSearchDoctrine.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).  
  
enforcement.27 Generally, “mere knowledge and passive acquiesce by the government” is not 
enough.28 Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at NYU’s Information Law 
Institute and Visiting Fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project, describes the 
second criterion of the test to largely be a “mirage[.]”29 He explains that because the test is 
derived from common law agency principles, “A does not become B’s agent simply because A 
acts: (1) in a way to benefit B; and (2) out of a desire to benefit B.”30 Instead, there must be some 
action on B’s part.31 Therefore, Brennan-Marquez concludes that it is hardly surprising that a 
Fourth Amendment test patterned on agency principles would “inspire courts to treat prodding by 
law enforcement (of some kind) as a necessary, if not always sufficient, condition of state 
action.”32  
                                                        
27
   United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The general principles for determining whether 
a private individual is acting as a governmental instrument or agent for Fourth Amendment purposes has been 
synthesized into a two part test. According to this test, we must inquire: (1) whether the government knew of and 
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law 
enforcement efforts or further his own ends.”); see also, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law 
Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 806 (2016) (analyzing the development of the private search doctrine and 
interpretation of the government agent test by the lower courts). 
28
   See, eg., United States v. Leffall, 82 F.3d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a government agent must 
be involved directly as a participant, not a mere witness, or indirectly as an encourager of the private person’s 
search); United States v. Crowley, 285 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting a key factor of the test is whether the 
government requested the action or offered the individual a reward). 
29
   Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 806 (2016). 
30
   Id. (citing United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, (4th Cir. 2003) (looking to the “common law of 
agency” to determine whether a private actor was operating as a state agent)). 
31
   Id. (citing 19 Williston on Contracts § 54:14 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that “the relationship of principal 
and agent…requires mutual consent,” and in particular that it “turns on the intentions and actions of the putative 
principal, not the agent.”)). 
32
   Id. at 807. 
  
The Supreme Court first introduced the concept of the private search doctrine in Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire.33 In this case, police suspected that Edward Coolidge was involved with the 
kidnapping and murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, Pamela Mason.34 After learning that Coolidge 
had been away from home on the evening of Mason’s disappearance, the police went to the 
Coolidge residence to question him.35 During the initial interview, Coolidge denied any 
wrongdoing and voluntarily surrendered two shotguns and a rifle to the police.36 He also agreed 
to take a lie-detector test concerning his statements regarding his whereabouts on the night of 
Mason’s disappearance.37  
On the following Sunday, Coolidge reported to the police station where the lie detector 
would be administered, while two plainclothes policemen went to the Coolidge residence.38 
There, the plainclothes officers encountered Mrs. Coolidge and informed her that her husband 
was in “serious trouble.”39 The officers proceeded to question Mrs. Coolidge, who voluntarily 
turned over four guns and some clothes she believed her husband was wearing on the evening of 
                                                        
33
   Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (“Had Mrs. Coolidge, wholly on her own 
initiative, sought out her husband’s guns and clothing and then taken them to the police station to be used as 
evidence against him, there can be no doubt under existing law that the articles would later have been admissible in 
evidence.”). 
34
   Id. at 445. 
35
   Id. 
36
   Id.  
37
   Id. 
38
   Id. at 446.  
39
   Id.  
  
Mason’s disappearance.40 The evidence incriminated Coolidge, who was ultimately convicted of 
kidnapping and murder and sentenced to life in prison.41 
Prior to his conviction, Coolidge moved to suppress the evidence voluntarily surrendered to 
law enforcement by his wife.42 Coolidge argued that his wife was acting as an “instrument” of 
law enforcement when she brought out his guns and clothing and handed them over to the 
officers.43 Therefore, Coolidge asserted that he was the victim of an unlawful search and 
seizure.44 The Supreme Court rejected Coolidge’s argument and upheld the denial of his motion 
to suppress.45  
The Coolidge Court found that the officers did not “coerce or dominate” Mrs. Coolidge in 
any way.46 Instead, they stated that the officers did nothing more than direct her actions by the 
“more subtle techniques of suggestion that are available to officials in circumstances like 
these.”47 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would be “to hold, in effect, that a criminal 
suspect has constitutional protection against the adverse consequences of a spontaneous, good-
faith effort by his wife to clear him of suspicion.”48 The Court explained further that it is not part 
of the underlying policy of the Fourth Amendment to “discourage citizens from aiding to the 
                                                        
40
   Id.  
41
   Id. at 448.  
42
   Id. at 487.  
43
   Id.  
44
   Id.  
45
   Id. at 489. 
46
   Id.  
47
   Id. at 489-90. 
48
   Id. at 490.  
  
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals.”49 The Coolidge Court made clear that 
the Fourth Amendment was not triggered in this case.50 
The Supreme Court limited the private search doctrine in its decision in Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Labor Association.51 In Skinner, the Court considered regulations promulgated 
after the passage of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 to combat problems of alcohol and 
drug abuse by railroad employees.52 The regulations made post-accident toxicological testing 
mandatory.53 Accordingly, the railroad companies were obligated by the regulations to collect 
blood and urine samples after the occurrence of any number of railway incidents.54  Numerous 
employees and labor unions challenged the regulations as a violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights.55         
The Skinner Court first considered whether the Fourth Amendment was implicated by these 
tests.56 The Court held that the breath and urine tests required by the railroad companies in 
compliance with the regulations are searches that implicate the Fourth Amendment.57 The Court 
                                                        
49
   Id.  
50
   Id.; see also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 
802 (2016) (“In short, when Mrs. Coolidge provided evidence to the police, she was acting of her own volition, not 
as an instrument of the state. So the Fourth Amendment, far from being violated, was not even triggered.). 
51
   Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).  
52
   Id. at 606-07.  
53
   Id. at 609.  
54
   Id.  
55
   Id. at 612.  
56
   See Id. at 613-14 (“Before we consider whether the tests in question are reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, we must inquire whether the tests are attributable to the Government or its agents, and whether they 
amount to searches or seizures.”).  
57
  
further stated that private actors become agents or instruments of the state if they are legally 
required to perform such searches.58 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, explained to hold 
otherwise would allow legislative bodies to circumvent Fourth Amendment protection at will by 
deputizing private actors to perform searches that would otherwise fall to law enforcement.59 
Government action that is not compelled may still qualify as a Fourth Amendment search, if the 
government “removes all legal barriers to [a given type of search] and indeed [makes] plain not 
only its strong preference for [searches], but also its desire to share the fruits of [the] 
intrusions.”60 While the Skinner Court ultimately upheld the regulations as constitutional,61 the 
decision limited the private search doctrine in explaining that a seemingly private actor may 
become a de facto government agent by complying with government regulations.62   
B. How Far Is Too Far?: Defining The Scope Of Law Enforcement’s Subsequent Warrantless 
Search  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
   Id. at 614.  
58
   Id. at 614-16 (“The fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search does 
not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one. Here, specific features of the regulations combine to convince 
us that the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.”). 
59
   Id. at 615-16 (“In light of these provisions, we are unwilling to accept petitioners' submission that tests 
conducted by private railroads in reliance on Subpart D will be primarily the result of private initiative.”); see also  
Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Article: Outsourced Law Enforcement, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 803 (2016) 
60
   Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.  
61
   Id. at 633. (“We conclude that the compelling Government interests served by the FRA's regulations 
would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee. In view of our conclusion that, on the present record, the 
toxicological testing contemplated by the regulations is not an undue infringement on the justifiable expectations of 
privacy of covered employees, the Government's compelling interests outweigh privacy concerns.”).  
62
   Id. at 615-16. (“The Government has removed all legal barriers to the testing authorized by Subpart D, 
and indeed has made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such 
intrusions. In addition, it has mandated that the railroads not bargain away the authority to perform tests granted by 
Subpart D. These are clear indices of the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation, and suffice 
to implicate the Fourth Amendment.”).  
  
In Walter v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a “bizarre” set of facts that 
implicated the Fourth Amendment’s private search doctrine.63 In this case, a shipment containing 
871 boxes of eight-millimeter film was sent from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia.64 
The package was addressed to “Leggs, Inc.[,]” but was mistakenly delivered to “L’Eggs 
Products, Inc.”65 Upon arrival, L’Eggs Products’ employees inspected the shipment and its 
contents.66 The boxes’ labels displayed “suggestive drawings” of homosexual sexual activity and 
“explicit descriptions” of their contents.67 One of the employees then opened one or two of the 
boxes and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film by holding it up to the light.68 
The employees then contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”), who subsequently 
seized the films.69 The FBI then viewed the films with a projector “without making any effort to 
obtain a warrant or to communicate with the consignor or the consignee of the shipment.”70 
Petitioners were subsequently indicted and convicted on obscenity charges relating to the 
interstate transportation of the films after their motion to suppress evidence of the films was 
denied.71  
                                                        
63
   Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980).  
64
   Id. at 651.  
65
   Id.  
66
   Id.  
67
   Id. at 652.  
68
   Id.  
69
   Id.  
70
   Id.  
71
   Id.  
  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the convictions after finding that the 
FBI’s “unauthorized exhibition of films constituted an unreasonable invasion of their owner’s 
constitutionally protected interest in privacy.”72 Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of the 
majority, noted that it was “perfectly obvious” that the agents’ reason for viewing the films was 
to determine whether the owner was guilty of a federal crime.73 However, while the labels gave 
the agents probable cause to believe the films were obscene they were not sufficient to support a 
conviction.74 Justice Stevens took care to note that just because the FBI agents lawfully 
possessed the films, they did not automatically have authority to search their contents.“75 
Additionally, the fact that the packages had been opened by a private party before they were 
acquired by the FBI does not “excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant.”76 While the private 
search by the L’Eggs employees “frustrated that expectation in part[,]” it did not “simply strip 
the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection.”77 
Nearly forty years later, in United States v. Jacobsen, the Supreme Court held that a 
government agent’s warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is simply a 
replication of a search already conducted by a private party.78 In Jacobsen, Federal Express 
                                                        
72
   Id. at 654.  
73
   Id.  
74
   Id.  
75
   Id. (“Ever since 1878 when Mr. Justice Field’s opinion for the court in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 
established that sealed packages in the mail cannot be opened without a warrant, it has been settled than an officer’s 
authority to possess a package is distinct from his authority to examine its contents.”).  
76
   Id. at 656.  
77
   Id.  
78
   See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 116-19 (1984) (describing the standard for analyzing 
warrantless searches by a government agent of an item already searched by a party); See also Katie Matejka, Note: 
  
(“FedEx”) employees working at Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport accidently damaged and tore a 
package with a forklift.79 Pursuant to company policy, an office manager inspected the damaged 
package and opened it to examine the contents.80  Inside, the office manager discovered four zip-
lock plastic bags containing about six and a half ounces of white powder.81 Suspecting the 
substance to be cocaine, the FedEx employees notified the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA).82         
The first DEA agent arrived, inspected the package and performed a field test of the white 
powdery substance, confirming it to be cocaine.83 A short time later, more DEA agents arrived, 
inspected the package for themselves and performed another field test, which confirmed the 
results of the initial field test.84 The DEA agents then obtained a warrant to search the place 
where the package was addressed, executed the warrant, and arrested Jacobsen.85 The United 
States District Court of Minnesota declined to suppress the evidence and Jacobsen was convicted 
of possession with intent to distribute.86 Jacobsen appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
United States v. Lichtenberger: The Sixth Circuit Improperly Narrowed The Private Search Doctrine Of The Fourth 
Amendment In a Case of Child Pornography On A Digital Device, 49 Creighton L. Rev. 177, 180 (2015); This paper 
does not comment of the Supreme Court’s introduction and perceived expansion of the private search doctrine. For 
an interesting criticism of the Court’s decision in Jacobsen please see Kim A. Lambert, United States v. Jacobsen: 
Expanded Private Search Doctrine Undermining Fourth Amendment Values, 16 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 359 (1985).  
79
   Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).  
80
   Id.  
81
   Id.  
82
   Id.  
83
   Id.  
84
   Id. 111-12.  
85
   Id.  
86
   Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296, 298 (8th Cir. 1982). 
  
for the Eighth Circuit.87 The Eighth Circuit focused primarily on the agents’ field tests.88 The 
court ultimately reversed Jacobsen’s conviction, ruling that the field test expanded the private 
search and required a warrant.89 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.90  
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court focused entirely on the initial search 
conducted by the FedEx employees.91 The Court reasoned that the DEA agents’ subsequent field 
tests did not require a warrant because the “initial invasion” of Jacobsen’s package occurred 
during a private search.92 Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, even though the field tests 
exceed the scope of the private search, it was not a search under Katz, because it could “not 
compromise any legitimate expectation of privacy.”93 The positive test did not remove the 
reasonable expectation of privacy; instead that fact that whatever the white powder turned out to 
be was no longer a “private fact” there was no longer a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.94 
The Court was not willing to accept Jacobsen’s argument that the office manager’s decision to 
contact federal authorities made him a government actor.95 Further, the Court declared that the 
                                                        
87
   Id. at 299-300. 
88
   Id.  
89
   Id.  
90
   Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112-13.  
91
   Id. at 115.  
92
   Id.  
93
   Id.   
94
   Id. at 123.  
95
   See Id. at 114-15 (“The fact that agents of the private carrier independently opened the package and made 
an examination that might have been impermissible for a government agent cannot render otherwise reasonable 
official conduct unreasonable…[Here] the initial invasions of respondents’ package were occasioned by private 
action.”).   
  
motivation behind the employees’ conduct was irrelevant in applying the private search 




II.Applying The Private Search Doctrine To The Digital World  
The private search doctrine has justified searches in the digital world in a number of 
different contexts.97 The most common cases include computer repairpersons,98 hacktivists,99 and 
Internet service providers100. The following cases illustrate different ways in which state and 
federal courts of appeals have applied the private search doctrine in these instances.  
A. The Computer Repairperson  
In State v. Lasaga, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the conviction of a college 
professor whose computer download history was monitored and reported by a student employed 
by the university to law enforcement.101 Professor Lasaga was employed by Yale University as a 
                                                        
96
   See Id. at 115 (it is irrelevant whether the intrusion was “accidental or deliberate”).  
97
   See e.g., State v. Horton, 962 So.2d 459, 463 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2007) (computer repairman discovering 
evidence of child pornography in the ordinary course of business is not a search under the Fourth Amendment); 
State v. Lasaga, 848 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 2004) (student employed by a university as a computer technician was not 
acting as a government agent when he monitored defendant’s computer and reported that he was downloading child 
pornography); United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (computer hacker acted as a private citizen 
when they hacked into defendant’s computer and provided law enforcement with evidence of child pornography); 
United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that AOL was operating as private actor, 
not a state agent, when it decided to has email traffic for child pornography and other contraband); United States v. 
Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding same).  
98
   See Lasaga, 848 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 2004); Horton, 962 So.2d 459, 463 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2007). 
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professor of geology and geophysics.102 On October 23, 1998, Victor Sletten, a Yale graduate 
student, informed Pal Gluhosky, a Yale employee responsible for ensuring that the geology 
department computers were functioning properly, that another student told him that Professor 
Lasaga downloaded child pornography onto his geology department office computer.103 
Gluhosky decided to monitor Professor Lasaga’s download history.104 From October 23 through 
October 30, 1998, Gluhosky monitored Professor Lasaga’s download activity and suspected that 
the Professor was in fact downloading child pornography.105 Gluhosky communicated his 
suspicions to his supervisors and was instructed to continue his activities.106  
On November 3, Gluhosky provided law enforcement with hard copies of computer logs 
detailing Lasaga’s computer activities and a CD that contained copies of images that the 
defendant had downloaded to a computer in the geology department.107 This information was 
subsequently turned over to the FBI.108 Based on Gluhosky’s information, federal officials 
obtained a search warrant for Professor Lasaga’s residence.109 During the search, FBI agents 
seized Lasaga’s computer, zip drives, floppy discs, compact discs, two homemade videotapes, 
and other items.110 Based on this evidence, Lasaga was charged with two counts of sexual assault 
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in the first degree, two counts of promoting a minor in an obscene performance, and two counts 
of risk of injury to a child.111 Lasaga filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the 
FBI’s search, which was denied by trial court denied.112 Lasaga then pled, but reserved the right 
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.113  
In upholding the trial court’s denial of Lasaga’s motion to suppress, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut agreed that Gluhosky’s actions did not implicate the Fourth Amendment as he was 
acting as a private party while monitoring Lasaga’s computer activities.114  The court found that 
the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that “Gluhosky was in no way acting as an agent 
of the government in obtaining the information and material which was utilized by [the FBI] in 
drafting the search warrant.”115 The police did not seek out Gluhosky and were not involved in 
his decision to obtain information regarding Lasaga’s computer activities.116 The court also 
emphasized that Gluhosky had no previous connection with the police and received nothing in 
return for his cooperation.117 While there was a dispute in the record regarding whether law 
enforcement asked Gluhosky to continue to monitor Lasaga and provide them with information 
or whether Gluhosky independently decided to do so, the court was indifferent as to the 
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significance of this discrepancy.118 The court ultimately determined that “police involvement was 
not so extensive as to have created an agency relationship between Gluhosky and the police.”119 
Similarly, in State v. Horton, The Second Circuit Court of Appeal for Louisiana found 
that a computer repairman’s actions in the ordinary course of business did not qualify as a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.120 In this case, Robert Horton took his computer to a local Best 
Buy for repairs.121 Horton instructed the computer technician, Christopher Stoll, to install a new 
hard drive, but not to remove the old one.122 After installing the new hard drive, Stoll followed 
Best Buy’s “post-op procedure” to see if he could repair issues related to problems with the 
computer’s power button and monitor display “flickering and shaking.”123 In doing so, Stoll 
decided to view an image from his own thumb drive, as was common procedure used by Best 
Buy technicians.124 Stoll then accessed the Microsoft Paint program to open the media file.125 
When Stoll opened Microsoft paint a default picture directory entitled “My Pictures” 
automatically opened and Stoll saw six thumbnail pictures of nude children engaged in sexual 
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acts.126 Stoll immediately alerted other Best Buy employees and they decided to call the 
police.127  
District Attorney investigator and computer forensics expert, Mark Fargerson, responded 
to the call and the Best Buy employees showed him the images they discovered.128 Fargerson 
then viewed additional images and determined they were in fact child pornography.129 This 
information was then used to obtain a search warrant for Horton’s computer.130 The subsequent 
search revealed over 100 pages of child pornography.131 Horton filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence, arguing that the “court should set some guidelines in what is a permissible private 
search by a computer technician.”132 Horton also argued that Fargerson exceeded the scope of the 
private search by the Best Buy employees because he “did additional procedures in opening and 
enlarging the photos[.]”133  
The trial court denied Horton’s motion to suppress and Horton appealed.134 The appellate 
court agreed with the trial court’s denial of Horton’s motion to suppress.135 The court noted that 
there is “no merit” to Horton’s argument that the Best Buy employees were acting on behalf of 
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law enforcement.136 The court found that the discovery of the unlawful pornographic images by 
the Best Buy employees was “inadvertent and unexpected.”137 Accordingly, the search qualified 
as a private search because it not connected to state authority in any way.138  
B. The Hacktivist 
Hacktivism is the act of hacking a website or computer network in an effort to convey a 
social or political message.139 Unlike malicious hackers, who invade computers or networks with 
the intent to cause harm, the hacktivist is usually motivated by a desire to serve a social cause.140 
A well-known example is the hacker group, Anonymous.141 In 2015, the group announced 
“Operation Death Eaters” in the wake of the Westminster child abuse scandal142 in London.143 In 
doing so, Anonymous vowed to target anyone connected to the scandal as well as the general 
child porn issue that was overwhelming British authorities.144 Similarly, in United States v. 
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Jarrett, the FBI and local enforcement agents received incriminating information via email from 
a hacker known only as “Unknownuser”.145   
Beginning in July 2000, Unknownuser began to supply federal and state officials with 
information related the downloading and sharing of child pornography.146  Dr. Bradley Steiger 
was the first individual Unknownuser exposed to the FBI.147 Unknownuser gained entry into 
Steiger’s computer via a “Trojan Horse”148 program attached to a picture Unknownuser posted to 
a news group frequented by pornography enthusiasts.149 Once Steiger downloaded the picture to 
his own computer, the Trojan horse program was also downloaded and Unknownuser was able to 
enter Steiger’s computer undetected.150 Unknownuser then searched Steiger’s hard drive and 
found evidence of child pornography, which he supplied to law enforcement.151  
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In November 2000, FBI Special Agent Duffy attempted to convince Unknownuser to 
reveal his identity and testify in Steiger’s case.152 Despite Agent Duffy’s assurances that 
Unknownuser would not be prosecuted for his hacking activities, Unknownuser refused to 
testify.153 After repeated failed attempts to convince Unknownuser to testify, Agent Duffy 
thanked Unknownuser for his assistance and stated, “[i]f you want to bring other information 
forward, I am available.”154 
Unknownuser did not contact law enforcement officials again until December 2001, 
when he sent an unsolicited email to law enforcement in Alabama.155 Unknownuser informed 
law enforcement that he had “found another child molester[,]” who he identified as William 
Jarrett.156 On December 4, 2001, Unknownuser sent thirteen email messages to law enforcement; 
including a “ten-part series of email with some forty-five attached files containing the ‘evidence’ 
that Unknownuser had collected on Jarrett.”157 Jarrett was indicted and arrested shortly 
thereafter.158 As before, FBI Agent Duffy again contacted Unknownuser and thanked him for his 
assistance in identifying Jarrett.159 Unknownuser and Agent Duffy exchanged emails and Agent 
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Duffy encouraged Unknownuser to remain in contact with a fellow agent, Agent Faulkner, via 
her personal email address.160   
After being indicted on child pornography charges, Jarrett moved to suppress the 
evidence obtained against him.161The district court denied the motion and Jarrett entered a 
conditional guilty plea.162 Prior to sentencing however, Jarrett reconsidered his earlier motion to 
suppress on the basis of new evidence revealing a series of emails exchanged between 
Unknownuser and FBI Agent Faulkner, begging shorty after Jarrett’s arrest.163 The government 
did not disclose these emails until after Jarrett entered his guilty plea.164 Specifically, Jarrett 
pointed to a series of emails dated December 19, 2001, in which Agent Faulkner explicitly 
thanked Unknownuser for providing the information to law enforcement.165  
Over the next few months, Agent Faulkner and Unknownuser maintained what the 
district court described as a “pen-pal” type correspondence.166 Agent Faulkner repeatedly 
expressed thanks and even admiration for Unknownuser’s assistance.167 Unknownuser told 
Agent Faulkner that he would continue his hacking activities and Agent Faulkner never 
discouraged that.168 Upon consideration of the series of emails, the district court reversed its 
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earlier decision and suppressed the evidence.169 In doing so, the court reasoned that the “totality 
of all the contact between law enforcement and Unknownuser encouraged Unknownuser to 
continue his behavior and to remain in contact with the FBI.”170 The district court concluded that 
the Government and Unknownuser had “expressed their consent to an agency relationship[]” and 
the evidence obtained on the basis of Unknownuser’s hacking activities violated Jarrett’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.171 The government appealed.172 
 The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Coolidge 
and Skinner in describing the private search doctrine and setting out the government agent test.173 
While the Government conceded that Unkownuser intended to assist law enforcement, it argued 
that the Government did not know or acquiesce in Unknownuser’s search “in a manner sufficient 
to transform Unknownuser into an agent of the Government” to make the search 
unconstitutional.174 The burden is placed on the defendant to “demonstrate that the Government 
knew of and acquiesced in the private search and that the private individual intended to assist law 
enforcement authorities.175 However, the 4th Circuit noted that they have “required evidence of 
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more than mere knowledge and passive acquiesce by the Government before finding an agency 
relationship.”176 With these principles in mind, the 4th Circuit rejected Jarrett’s contentions that 
Unknownuser was acting as a government agent.177 
 In reversing the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence against Jarrett, the 4th 
Circuit emphasized the fact that Unknownuser’s email exchange with Faulkner took place after 
Unknownuser had hacked into Jarrett’s computer and after the “fruits of Unknownuser’s 
hacking” had been made available to the FBI.178 The court found that Faulkner’s “knowledge and 
acquiescence was entirely post-search.”179 The court reasoned “such after-the-fact conduct 
cannot serve to transform the prior relationship between Unknownuser and the Government into 
an agency relationship with respect to the search of Jarrett’s computer.”180 While the Government 
“operated close to the line” in this case, Jarrett failed to “demonstrate the requisite level of 
knowledge and acquiesce sufficient to make Unknownuser a Government Agent when he hacked 
into Jarrett’s computer.”181 Even though the Government did not “actively discourage” 
Unknownuser from engaging in illegal hacking this did not transform him into a Government 
agent.182 Even though the 4th Circuit described the Government’s behavior as “discomforting[,]” 
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they noted that the Government is under no “special obligation” to discourage these types of 
activities.183  
C. The Internet Service Provider  
AOL is a well-known Internet service provider (“ISP”) that provides email and web services 
to its users.184 AOL identifies certain files that “may damage its network” with “hash values.”185 
A hash value is “an algorithmic calculation that yields an alphanumeric value for a file.”186 Files 
containing child pornography were amongst those files AOL assigned hash values.187 During the 
regular course of business, AOL scans files sent through its network with a tool it calls the 
“Image Detection and Filtering Process.”188 When the program detects files with a hash value 
associated with child pornography, it automatically forwards a report to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children.189  
In September 2010, the filtering program triggered an alert for images depicting child 
pornography being sent from the e-mail account of Jeremy Stevenson.190 Law enforcement 
officials obtained a search warrant for Stevenson’s home and eventually uncovered a large 
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quantity of child pornography stored on his computers and digital storage devices.191 Stevenson 
was indicted on charges of possessing child pornography.192 Stevenson filed a motion to suppress 
the images discovered by AOL, arguing that the ISP’s scanning of his emails violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.193 The district court denied the motion, explaining that AOL was a private 
actor and was therefore not constrained by the Fourth Amendment.194 Stevenson entered a 
conditional guilty plea, while reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion 
to suppress.195 
 On appeal, Stevenson argued that AOL acted as a government agent when it scanned his 
emails because Title 18, United States Code Section 2258A(a) “requires AOL to report to the 
National Center [for Missing and Exploited Children] any apparent violation of the child 
pornography laws that AOL discovers while providing electronic communication services.”196 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner, Stevenson likened Section 2258A(a) to the 
testing requirements that made optional tests amount to state action.197 Additionally, Section 
2258B(a) ISPs from suit arising from the performance of the reporting responsibilities implied 
therein.  
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The 8th Circuit summarily rejected this argument and found that the regulations at issue 
neither authorized AOL to scan its users’ emails and did not remove legal barriers to scanning by 
preempting private contracts that forbid scans.198 The court concluded that the “only similarity 
between the statutes that Stevenson cites and the Skinner regulations in that both include 
reporting obligations.”199 However, a reporting requirement, standing alone, “does not transform 
an Internet service provide into a government agent whenever it chooses to scan files sent on its 
network for child pornography.”200 
 
III. Riley v. California and the Supreme Court’s Push To Protect Data Privacy  
In Riley v. California, a unanimous Supreme Court held that police officers may not 
search an individual’s cellphone incident to arrest and must generally secure a warrant before 
conducting a search of an arrestee’s cell phone.201 In Riley, the Court considered two cases 
presenting a common question: do law enforcement agents need to acquire a search warrant 
before they search an arrestee’s cellular phone.202   
In the first case, David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired 
registration tags.203 During the stop, the officer discovered that Riley’s driver’s license had been 
                                                        
198
   Id. at 829-30. 
199
   Id. at 830.  
200
   Id.  See also United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding same).  
201
   Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).  
202
   Id. at 2480.  
203
   Id.  
  
suspended.204 Pursuant to department policy, the officer impounded Riley’s vehicle and 
conducted an inventory search of the car.205 The officer discovered two handguns hidden under 
the cars hood and Riley was arrested for unlicensed possession of concealed and loaded 
firearms.206 An officer then searched Riley incident to arrest and found evidence associated with 
the “Bloods” street gang.207 Upon accessing Riley’s smartphone, the officer noticed some words 
or contacts preceded by the letters “CK” or “Crip Killers.”208 Two hours later, at the police 
station a detective from the gang squad went through Riley’s phone, searching for further 
evidence of gang affiliation.209 During the search, the detective found photographs of Riley 
standing in front of a car they suspected to have been involved in a shooting a few weeks 
earlier.210 Riley was subsequently charged in connection with the shooting and sentenced to a 
term of fifteen years to life in prison.211  
In the second case, a police officer observed Brima Wurie make a drug sale from his 
car.212 After arresting him and brining him to the police station, the officers seized two of Wurie’s 
cellphones.213 Unlike Riley’s case however, Wurie’s phone was a “flip phone.”214 The police 
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noticed that Wurie’s phone was repeatedly receiving calls from a source identified as “my house” 
on the phone’s external screen.215 Eventually, the officers opened the phone and observed a photo 
of a woman and baby set as the phone’s wallpaper.216After accessing the call log, the police were 
able determine the phone number associated with the “my house” label and traced it to Wurie’s 
apartment building.217 The officers went to the building, saw Wurie’s name on a mailbox and 
observed a woman through the window who resembled the wallpaper photo on Wurie’s phone.218 
Based on the information from the cellphone and their observations, the officers obtained a 
search warrant and searched Wurie’s apartment.219 The subsequent search uncovered 215 grams 
of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash.220 Wurie 
was convicted of numerous offenses was sentenced to 262 months in prison.221   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated both cases.222 In describing the 
social significance of cellphones, the Court characterized them as being a “pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life.” 223 So much so that Chief Justice Roberts quipped that the “proverbial 
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visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” 224 While 
Riley and Wurie utilized phones with “varying levels of sophistication,” the Riley Court noted 
that both devices are based on technologies that were “inconceivable” when seminal cases like 
Chimel and Robinson were decided.225 Accordingly, the Court refused to extend the rational of 
these cases to cell phone searches, instead mandating that officers generally secure a warrant 
before conducting a search.226    
The Court observed that cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense 
from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee’s person.227 Considering that the Court 
described cell phones as “minicomputers” capable of storing immense amounts of data, this 
conclusion is not surprising.228 Additionally, the Court noted that cell phones collect many 
distinct types of data and create numerous privacy issues.229 With this in mind, the Court 
declined to extend the primary Chimel rationales230 to this case.231  
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First, the Court noted that unlike physical objects, digital data does not pose a risk to 
officer safety.232 Second, the Court dismissed the Government’s concerns related to evidence 
preservation.233 Further, Chief Justice Roberts explained that while Robinson’s categorical rule 
allowing searches upon every lawful custodial arrest struck the “appropriate balance in the 
context of physical objects,” its rationales lost logical force with respect to the “digital content on 
cell phones.”234 Ultimately, the Riley Court limited Robinson’s search incident to arrest rationale 
in cases involving cell phones.235 Katie Matejka astutely notes that the Riley Court made its 
holding clear: “it is not the case that cell phones may never be searched by law enforcement – it 
is that law enforcement must first obtain a warrant to search the cell phone.”236 
IV. The Current Circuit Split: Riley’s Impact On The Private Search Doctrine  
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The Court’s decision in Riley was hailed by many in the media as a “sweeping victory for 
privacy rights in the digital age.”237 Commentators suggested that the Supreme Court had 
“entered the digital age and fundamentally changed how the Constitution protects our 
privacy.”238 Others remained cautiously optimistic that this decision signals that the Court is 
more prepared to engage in the challenges of the digital age ahead.239 However, the decision has 
created a circuit split amongst lower courts, particularly related to the scope of the private search 
doctrine.240  
When evaluating searches of electronic devices, Professor Orin Kerr explains that the 
application of the private search doctrine raises the following inquiry: “When a private party sees 
a file on a computer, what exactly has been searched for purposes of later reconstruction?”241 Put 
another way, the scope of the private search doctrine governs “whether authorities can search an 
                                                        
237
   See Adam Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphone: Supreme Court Says Phones Can’t Be 
Searched Without a Warrant, The New York Times (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-cellphones-search-privacy.html?_r=0.  
238
   See Stephen Vladeck, How the Supreme Court Changed America This Year, Politico Magazine (July 1, 
2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/how-the-supreme-court-changed-america-this-year-108497 
239
   See Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley, The Washington Post-The Volokh Conspiracy (June 25, 2014) 
(commenting that the Court’s decision show how it would create very different results today in light of technological 
change and social practice); Marc Rotenberg and Alan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v. California, a unanimous 




   Compare United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001) (adopting single unit approach – 
defendant lost his expectation of privacy in entire disk when some of the files on it were viewed by a private party), 
and Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012) (upholding search where police were substantially certain of the 
fact it contained child pornography and were free to search the entire device without a warrant), with United States 
v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that police could not search a laptop without being virtually 
certain that the search would not exceed the earlier search by a private party), and United States v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 
1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (adopting individual file approach and suppressing video evidence viewed by police that was 
not viewed during original search by private party).  
241
   Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split On Private Search Doctrine For Computers, The 




entire collection of devices (e.g., CDs, USB or external hard drives) after a private party 
searched only a subset of the devices.”242 The answer, according to Professor Kerr, is dependent 
upon what the right “measuring unit” is.243 Is it “the data, the file, the folder, the physical device, 
or something else?”244 Prior to the Supreme Courts decision in Riley, the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits adopted the single unit or physical device approach.245 However, in post-Riley decisions, 
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a data or file level approach.246 The following 
subsections analyze these different approaches, their underlying principles, and how they were 
impacted by the Court’s decision in Riley. 
A. Pre-Riley: Substantial Certainty And The Single Unit Approach247  
In United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit adopted the single unit approach.248 In this case, 
defendant Robert Runyan became estranged from his wife, Judith, and subsequently filed for 
divorce.249 In the months following their separation, Judith made several trips to Runyan’s home 
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to retrieve her personal property.250 On one of these occasions, Judith found a desktop computer 
she claimed was hers.251 Judith and her friend took the computer as well as a number of floppy 
disks, CDs, and ZIP disks that were on the desk and on the floor.252 Later, Judith’s friend viewed 
“approximately twenty of the CDS and floppy disks” and found they contained images of child 
pornography.253 Judith and her friend turned the materials over to law enforcement.254 The police 
subsequently reviewed the disks without obtaining a warrant and uncovered more evidence of 
child pornography.255 Runyan was indicted on child pornography charges.256 
Runyan filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the pre-warrant searches of the disks violated 
the Fourth Amendment.257 The trial court denied the motion, finding that the pre-warrant police 
searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment because “the police did not exceed the scope of 
the private search conducted by Judith and her companions.”258 Runyan was then convicted and 
sentenced to 300 months in prison.259 Runyan appealed, arguing in relevant part that the trial 
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court erred in “failing to suppress the evidence obtained directly and indirectly from the pre-
warrant police searches.”260  
The Fifth Circuit initially stated that a defendant’s expectation of privacy with respect to an 
unopened container is “persevered unless the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents 
of the container has already been frustrated because the contents were rendered obvious by the 
private search.”261 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that this policy would prevent “fishing 
expeditions” and ensure that police officers are “substantially certain” of the contents before they 
open the container.262 Accordingly, the court concluded that the police’s pre-warrant examination 
of the disks not viewed by Judith or her friend “clearly exceeded the scope of the private 
search.”263 The court emphasized the lack of any identifying marks on the disks that would alert 
an ordinary viewer of their contents.264 Additionally, it was not enough that the disks were found 
in the same location of Runyan’s residence where other evidence of child pornography was 
found.265 Therefore, the court concluded the police “exceeded the scope of the private search 
[…] when they examined disks that the private searches did not examine.”266 
Despite the suppression of the unviewed disks, the court refused to accept Runyan’s argument 
that the police also exceeded the scope of the private search because they examined more files on 
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the disks than the private searchers did.267 Even though the record did not clearly indicate what 
files Judith and her friend initially viewed, the court did not suppress this evidence.268  
The Fifth Circuit explained, in the context of a closed container search police do not exceed 
the private search when they examine more items within the closed container that the private 
individuals did not.269 Accordingly, the Runyan court concluded, “police do not engage in a new 
‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes each time they examine a particular item found within 
the container.”270 In this case, the container was the disk and the prior private search eliminated 
any expectation of privacy in the container.271 Utilizing this approach, a more “detailed police 
search of the containers […] did not offend the Fourth Amendment.272 Holding otherwise would 
“over-deter” law enforcement from “engaging in lawful investigation of containers where any 
reasonable expectation of privacy has already been eroded.”273  
The Seventh Circuit adopted Runyan’s reasoning in Rann v. Atchison.274 In this case, 
defendant Steven Rann was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of 
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child pornography.275 The defendant’s 15-year-old daughter, S.R., reported to law enforcement 
officials that he had sexually assaulted her.276 S.R. also supplied the police with a digital camera 
memory card containing images of Rann sexually assaulting S.R.277 Sometime later, S.R.’s 
mother brought police a computer zip drive that contained additional pornographic images of 
S.R. and her half-sister, K.G.278 Rann did not move to suppress the images found on the zip drive 
and camera memory.279 However, after being convicted Rann filed a habeas petition asserting 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppresses the images recovered from 
the storage devices.280 The Illinois Appellate Court denied the motion and Rann appealed.281 
The 7th Circuit rejected Rann’s argument that police exceeded the scope of the private search 
when it viewed additional items on the storage devices without first obtaining a 
warrant.282Applying the principles of Runyan, the 7th Circuit additionally stated that even if the 
police “more thoroughly” searched the digital storage devices the police search did not “exceed 
or expand” the scope of the initial private search.283 The Rann court reasoned that this is because 
S.R. and her mother knew the contents of the storage devices and police were “substantially 
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certain” that the devices contained child pornography.284 Accordingly, law enforcement was free 
to search the entire device without warrant and without violating the Fourth Amendment.285 
 
B. Post-Riley: Narrowing The Scope Of The Private Search Doctrine And The File Level 
Approach  
 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a 
“much narrower” scope for the private search doctrine as it applies to electronic devices.286 First, 
in United States v. Lichtenberger, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment when it viewed the contents of 
the defendant’s computer without a warrant.287 In this case, defendant Lichtenberger and his 
girlfriend, Karley Holmes, lived together.288 After Holmes learned that the defendant was 
previously convicted of child pornography offenses she had him removed from the shared 
home.289 Later that day, Holmes retrieved the defendant’s laptop with intention of searching it for 
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evidence of child pornography.290 After hacking the password, Holmes “clicked on different 
folders” and eventually found thumbnail images of “adults engaging in sexual acts with 
minors.”291 After clicking through several of the images, Holmes closed the computer and 
contacted the police.292 
Officer Huston responded to the call and asked Holmes to show him what he discovered.293 
Holmes proceeded to “open several folders” and “began clicking on random thumbnail images” 
to show the officer.294 Officer Huston recognized the images as child pornography and asked 
Holmes to shut down the laptop.295 Holmes later testified that she viewed approximately 100 
images of child pornography saved in “several subfolders inside a folder entitled ‘private’.”296 
Additionally, she testified that she showed Officer Huston “a few pictures” from these files.297 
However, Holmes was “not sure” if they were among the original images she had seen in her 
original search.298 Lichtenberger was indicted on child pornography charges.299 The defendant 
filed a motion to suppress, arguing that “when Officer Huston directed Holmes to show him what 
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she had found, [she] was acting as an agent of the government[,]” in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.300 Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Riley, the district court granted 
Lichtenberger’s motion to suppress the laptop evidence.301 The Government appealed.302 
In upholding the district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals first concluded 
that Holmes’s initial search qualified as a private search.303 However, the Lichtenberger Court 
found that the scope of Officer Huston’s search exceeded that of Holmes’ private search.304 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the Riley Court’s concerns305 related to the 
immense storage capacity of digital devices and the implications such data has on privacy 
concerns.306  It is because of these concerns that the court reasoned that Lichtenberger’s laptop 
should be afforded the same level of protection as the cell phones in Riley.307 Additionally, the 
court emphasized that the police could not be “virtually certain” that the subsequent search was 
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limited to the images Holmes previously viewed.308 Even though the images viewed by law 
enforcement were evidence of child pornography they could have revealed any other amount of 
private information unrelated to the crime.309 This lack of certainty was “dispositive” and 
supported the court’s decision to uphold the district court’s suppression of the evidence.310  
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar approach in United States v. Johnson.311 In this case, 
defendants Alan Johnson and Jennifer Sparks accidently left their cell phone at a Wal-Mart 
store.312 Linda Vo, a Wal-Mart employee, found the phone and arranged to return it to the co-
defendants.313 However, before returning it Vo decided to look at the contents of the phone, 
which was not password-protected.314 Upon doing so, Vo discovered images and videos of child 
pornography.315  
Vo told her fiancé, David Widner, that she saw some “pretty weird” pictures involving a 
young girl.316 Widner decided to view the images himself and scrolled through all of the 
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thumbnail images in the phone’s photo album.317 He also opened a few images to full size and 
watched one video.318 After showing them to Vo, they contacted the police and turned over the 
phone.319 Detective O’Reilly subsequently viewed the images on the phone, confirming they 
were in fact child pornography.320 Detective O’Reilly opened all of the images to full size and 
viewed both the video that Widner had seen and another Widner had not.321 Johnson and Sparks 
filed motions to suppress, which the district court denied.322  
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that Detective O’Reilly did not exceed the scope of the 
private search when he looked at photos – thumbnail and full-size images - or watched videos 
that Widner had viewed.323 However, the court found that Detective O’Reily did exceed the 
scope of the private search when he watched the video Widner had not watched.324 The court 
reasoned that allowing the second video to be admitted, “when no private party had first watched 
it” would run afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley. As in Lichtenberg, the Johnson 
court focused on the Supreme Court’s emphasis of data storage and privacy implications.325 The 
court stated that a search of the cell phone may have “removed certain information from the 
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Fourth Amendment’s protections,” but not all of it.326 Accordingly, the officer’s viewing of the 
second video exceeded the scope of the private search and was suppressed.327  
V. Conclusion  
While this paper does not advocate for a particular approach, the author recognizes that 
there are strong proponents and critics on both sides.328 In analyzing the current circuit split, 
the author hopes to have demonstrated the need for the Supreme Court to take action and 
settle the current split. This becomes clear when one recognizes that the only thing that 
distinguishes these factually similar fact patterns is the Riley decision.329  
The Pre-Riley cases, Runyan and Rann, hold that a private search of one file in an 
electronic device opens the entire device up subsequent search by law enforcement. The Post-
Riley cases, Lichtenberger and Johnson, mirror Riley and focus on the privacy implications 
associated with searching private data. Accordingly, these cases hold that a subsequent law 
enforcement search cannot exceed the specific files viewed. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Riley has impacted the application of the private search doctrine, even though it is not a 
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private search case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should settle the current circuit split and 
clarify the contours of Fourth Amendment in the digital world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
